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RECENT CASES
in conjunction with CPLR section 308(4). Whether this method of obtaining
in personam jurisdiction is in accord with due process has not been decided
by the Supreme Court.
BRIAN J. TROY
CIVIL PROCEDURE-EuRoPEAN AIRLINE FOUND "DOING BUisNESs"
To SATISFY JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS, ALTHOUGH IT MAINTAINED No
AIRCRAFT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES, AND TORT UPON WHICH SUIT WAS
BASED OCCURRED IN FRANCE
Plaintiff, an airline hostess for Trans-World Airlines, brought suit against
defendant, Finnish National Airline, for personal injuries allegedly caused
by defendant's negligence. Plaintiff alleged she was struck by a baggage cart,
which was forcibly thrown upon her person by an excessive blast of air emanating
from one of defendant's airplanes, as it was moving across an airfield ramp.
The accident occurred at Orly Airport, Paris, France, and the summons and
complaint were properly served upon the Agency and Interline Manager in
New York state.' Pursuant to New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules
(hereinafter CPLR), Rule 3211(a)(8),2 defendant moved for dismissal, for
lack of jurisdictional "basis." The supreme court, at Special Term,3 denied
defendant's motion, and defendant appealed from the order, contending that
the airline was a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Finland, where
its principal offices were located, and that it was not "qualified" to do business
in New York state. The airline, moreover, conducted no flights, either begin-
ning or ending, in New York state, nor did it operate aircraft anywhere within
the United States. It maintained a small office in New York City, where reser-
vations were transmitted to the European offices. In addition, some minor
publicity and information activities were carried on by it. The office did
not, however, sell any tickets, nor did any of the staff members have author-
ity to bind defendant company. Therefore, reasoned defendant, it was not
doing sufficient business to meet the requirements of CPLR section 301. 4 The
Appellate Division,5  agreeing with the defendant, reversed the order
of the lower court and dismissed the action. The Court of Appeals, in an
opinion delivered by Chief Judge Desmond, reversed the order of the Appellate
1. Pursuant to N.Y. CPLR section 311: "Personal service upon a corporation ...
shall be made by delivering the summons as follows: 1. upon any domestic or foreign
corporation, to an officer, director, managing or general agent, or cashier or assistant
cashier or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service. "
2. Providing: "A party may move for judgment dismissing one or more causes of
action asserted on the ground that . . . the court has not jurisdiction of the person of
the defendant. .. ."
3. Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 151 N.Y.L.J., February 18, 1964, p. 15, col. 2
(Sup. Ct. 1964).
4. Providing: "A court may exercise such jurisdiction over persons, property, or
status as might have been exercised heretofore."
5. 22 A.D.2d 16, 253 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1st Dep't 1964).
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Division, one judge dissenting. Held, that a foreign airline corporation which
maintained a small office in New York state, and which conducted some minor
business activities within the state, but which operated no aircraft within
the state, was "doing business" in sufficient quantity to become subject to the
state's jurisdiction in a suit for recovery of damages for personal injuries sus-
tained in a foreign country. Bryant v. Finnish National Airline, 15 N.Y.2d
426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965).
In order for a forum to exert jurisdiction, in its most generic sense, three
requirements6 must be fulfilled: (a) jurisdiction over the subject matter,7
(b) proper notice of the proceedings to the defendant,8 and (c) sufficient basis.
The problem herein is the last noted, that of basis. In New York state, the
two basic provisions concerning jurisdiction are CPLR sections 301 and 302.
Section 302 applies the test of "transacts any business," and is applicable
only where the "wrong [is] connected with or flow[s] from such business
transacted in the state,"9 whereas section 301, utilizing the "doing business"
test, applies whether or not the wrong arises from the business carried on within
the state. However, "doing business" as a quantitative yardstick requires a
greater number of connections between the foreign entity and forum state,
than does "transacts any business."'1 The reasons for the distinctions
between sections 301 and 302 seem to be both equitable and historical.
If the corporation's wrong did not arise from its activities here, it would
seem more equitable to require the plaintiff to show a substantially greater
amount of connections between the corporation and the state, in order for
the forum to require that the foreign corporation travel into the forum to defend
a suit against itself. Under the earliest decisions," in order for a judicial forum
to wield its power in personam over a "natural" person, actual physical con-
trol over the person of the defendant was required; the party necessarily had
6. "Exercise of judicial power by the state through its courts requires the satisfac-
tion of requirements which fall under three heads: subject matter, basis, and service." 1
Weinstein, Korn, Miller, New York Civil Practice § 301.01 (1963).
7. See Elliot v. Piersol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328 (1828); Benz v. New York State Thru-
way Authority, 9 N.Y.2d 486, 174 N.E.2d 727, 215 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1961).
8. See Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928);
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
9. Bryant v. Finnish Natl Airline, 22 A.D.2d 16, 22, 253 N.Y.S.2d 215, 221 (1st
Dep't 1964).
10. 1 Weinstein, Korn, Miller, New York Civil Practice, § 302.06 (1963). See Also
e.g., Nexsen v. Ira Haupt, 44 Misc. 2d 629, 254 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Ellis v. Newton
Paper Co., 44 Misc. 2d 134, 253 N.Y.S.2d 47 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Janklow v. Williams, 43
Misc. 2d 1053, 252 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Lewis v. American Archives Ass'n, 43
Misc. 2d 721, 252 N.Y.S.2d 217 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Greenberg v. R.S.P. Realty Corp.,
43 Misc. 2d 182, 250 N.Y.S.2d 460 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Developers Small Business Inv. Corp, v.
Puerto Rico Land & Dev. Corp., 42 Misc. 2d 23, 246 N.Y.S.2d 896 (Sup. Ct. 1964);
Irgang v. Pelton & Crane Co., 42 Misc. 2d 70, 247 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Jump v.
Duplex Vending Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 950, 246 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Steele v.
DeLeeuw, 40 Misc. 2d 807, 244 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
11. E.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); See also, McDonald v. Mabee,
243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
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to be served within the forum state. In the case of an "artificial" person, 12 the
problem was more complex, because of the innate difficulty of finding the
corporation legally present outside its home state.'8 To subject a corporation
to jurisdiction a notion of "implied consent" was adopted by some states,14
wherein a corporate body upon entering a foreign state impliedly consented
to submit itself to the state's jurisdiction. Other states utilized a notion of
"presence"' 8 or of "doing business,"' 6 whereby a corporate entity would be
adjudged present within a forum merely by its activities there, so long as
some reasonable connection with the corporation's presence within the state
and its primary functions could be established. The notion of "minimum con-
tacts"'71 was set down in the landmark case of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington,18 suggesting that a foreign defendant need only have certain
minimal contacts with the forum state so as not to "offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" ' 19 Utilizing as its basis
the more flexible standard as announced in International Shoe, the New York
state legislature enacted CPLR section 302. Thus, the notion of "minimum
contacts" was embodied in the test of "transacts any business," and thereby
a new and less rigid test of jurisdiction emerged in addition to the relatively
inelastic tests of "residence" and "doing business." Under the "minimum con-
tacts" rationale, the commission of a single tortious act,2 0 or the execution of
a contract,2 within the state could be deemed sufficient to subject a corporation
to the state's jurisdiction, on causes of action arising therefrom. Thus, the
12. A creature of the state-i.e., a corporate entity is such by virtue of being created
by the state, through the issuance of the charter by the sovereign. "A corporation is an
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the
mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation
confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence." Dartmouth College
v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
13. E.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 517, 588 (1839).
14. E.g., Layfayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856); Louisville, C.
& C. R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
15. E.g., Barrow SS. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898).
16. E.g., J. R. Watkins Co. v. Hamilton, 32 Ala. App. 361, 26 So. 2d 207 (1946);
Sillin v. Hessig-Ellis Drug Co., 181 Ark. 386, 26 S.W.2d 122 (1930); Smith v. Nolting
First Mortgage Corp., 45 Ga. App. 253, 164 S.E. 219 (1932); State v. Winstead, 66 Idaho
504, 162 P.2d 894 (1945); Lee v. Memphis Pub. Co., 195 Miss. 264, 14 So. 2d 351,
(1943); Brocia v. Franklin Plan Corp., 235 App. Div. 421, 257 N.Y. Supp. 167 (4th
Dep't 1932); Harrison v. Corley, 226 N.C. 184, 37 S.E.2d 489 (1946); KIuver v. Middle-
west Grain Co., 44 N.D. 210, 173 N.W. 468 (1919); Deaton Truck Lines v. Bahnson Co.,
207 S.C. 226, 36 S.E.2d 465 (1945); Wabash R. v. Dist. Ct. of Third Jud. Dist. in and
for Salt Lake County, 109 Utah 526, 167 P.2d 973 (1946).
17. See e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
18. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
19. Id. at 316.
20. E.g., Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Nelson v. Miller,
11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957); See also, Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
21. E.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). New York cases
have in fact gone even further. See e.g., Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke,
Inc., Feathers v. McLucas, Singer v. Walker, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8,
15 Buffalo L. Rev. 181 (1965).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
state legislatures now have the option to delineate those instances where their
judicial forums will have the power to render and enforce judgments over
non-resident corporations,2 2 within the limits of due process.23
The applicable jurisdictional test in the instant case is that of "doing
business" as incorporated by CPLR section 301, since the act complained of did
not arise from the defendant's activities within the state.24 In addition to the
case law, under CPLR section 301 the legislature delegates to the courts the
power to ". . . exercise such jurisdiction over persons, property, or status
as might have been exercised heretofore. .. ." The use of the language ". . . as
might have been exercised heretofore," taken in conjunction with the intent
and objectives of the drafters of the CPLR, "to make it possible, with very
limited exceptions, for a litigant in New York courts to take full advantage of
the state's constitutional power over persons and things," 28 reasonably leads
to the conclusion that the court is not limited to any specific test of "doing
business" or of "presence." Under CPLR section 301 therefore, a court may
continue to develop such jurisdictional tests as were within their power to
adopt before the enactment of the CPLR,20 as long as they do not offend the
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.12 7 The original stand-
ard used to obtain a quantitative measurement of a corporation's activities
under the "doing business" test was whether or not the corporation did a
substantial amount of its main business 28 or a "reasonable amount of its
business" 29 within the state. Presently, the notion of "systematic, regular and
permanent [activities]" 30 is in the foreground. To determine whether a corpora-
tion's activities constitute "doing business," the classic "presence"3 1 test is
used:
If in fact it [the corporation] is here, if it is here, not occasionally
or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence and continuity,
then, whether its business is interstate or local, it is within the juris-
diction of our courts .... 32
A major corollary of applying the "presence" test, of course, is the notion
that each case must be decided on the basis of its own peculiar facts.83 In
22. For further discussion of jurisdictional history see: Hoffman, Plastic Frontiers
of State Judicial Power Over Non-Residents, 24 Brooklyn L. Rev. 291 (1958); Note, 73
Harv. L. Rev. 909 (1960).
23. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Riverside and Dan
River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1915); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
24. Bryant v. Finnish Natl Airline, 22 A.D.2d 16, 22, 253 N.Y.S.2d 215, 221 (Ist
Dep't 1964).
25. New York, Second Preliminary Report of the Advisory Committee on Practice
and Procedure [N.Y. Legis. Doc. 1958, No. 131, p. 37.
26. 1 Weinstein, Korn, Miller, New York Civil Practice, § 301.01 (1963).
27. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
28. See Holzer v. Dodge Bros., 233 N.Y. 216, 135 N.E. 268 (1922).
29. Brocia v. Franklin Plan Corp., 235 App. Div. 421, 422, 257 N.Y. Supp. 167, 169(4th Dep't 1932).
30. Joseph v. Litke, 13 A.D.2d 736, 737, 214 N.Y.S.2d 934, 935 (1st Dep't 1961).
31. As set forth in Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
32. Id. at 267, 115 N.E. at 917.
33. Cf. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Matter of
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Dineen v. United Airlines Transp. Corp.,34 the court held that a foreign cor-
poration which operated no aircraft within the state, but which maintained an
office in New York City, where its employees engaged in the solicitation of
business and the sale of tickets, was not "doing business" to render it susceptible
to jurisdiction. In the companion case of Jensen v. United Airlines Transp.
Corp.,35 however, the opposite conclusion was reached on appeal, based on
additional facts pleaded by the plaintiff, as follows: an alternate airport within
the state was maintained by the defendant, in addition to a passenger station
from whence defendant transported its passengers in company limousines to
the airport. More recently in Great Lakes Press Corp. v. Air Malta, Ltd.,3 6
involving an airline organized under the laws of Malta, which conducted its
transportation mainly in the Mediterranean and in Bermuda regions, it was
found that despite the fact that a domestic corporation was authorized to act
as its agent, maintain an office, and use defendant's name in soliciting business
and selling tickets, in addition to the authority to enter into related agreements
with other aircraft companies for defendant, defendant airlines was held
unamenable to jurisdiction. In Miller v. Surf Properties, Inc.,37 a fourth case
La Belle Creole Int'l, SA. v. Attorney Gen., 10 N.Y.2d 192, 176 N.E.2d 705, 219 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1961).
34. 166 Misc. 422, 2 N.Y.S.2d 567 (Sup. Ct. 1938). For further discussion of cases
concerning airlines and other transportation facilities see: Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours,
Ltd., 339 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1964), wherein foreign bus operators were not "doing business"
in New York through a travel agency to which passengers made direct payments for tickets;
Taca Int'l Airlines, SA. v. Rolls-Royce, Ltd., 15 N.Y.2d 97, 204 N.E.2d 329, 256 N.Y.S.2d
129 (1965), wherein the Court decided that a foreign corporation could not avoid jurisdic-
tion through an agent performing business within the state on its behalf, by use of a hollow
subsidiary; Elish v. St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co., 305 N.Y. 267, 112 N.E.2d 842 (1953), wherein
the Court declared that solicitation of business plus some additional activities related to
defendant's operations (board meetings) was sufficient to meet the test; Hastings v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 274 App. Div. 435, 84 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1st Dep't 1948), wherein the corpora-
tion engaged a domestic corporation as its distributor, the court found that the fact that
the domestic corporation used the name of the foreign corporation in the directories, on its
letterhead, and on its office door, was insufficient to show that the corporation was "doing
business" within the state.
35. 255 App. Div. 611, 8 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1st Dep't 1938), aff'd, 281 N.Y. 598, 22 N.E.2d
167 (1939) (mem.).
36. 202 Misc. 637, 111 N.Y.S.2d 802 (Sup. Ct. 1952). For further cases, of a general
nature, construing the "doing business" test see: Ralex Corp. v. White Machine Co., 243
F. Supp. 381 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); Ultra Sucro Co. v. Illinois Water Treatment Co., 146 F.
Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Sterling Novelty Corp. v. Frank & Hirsch Distr. Co., 299 N.Y.
208, 86 N.E.2d 564 (1949); Cochran Box & Mfg. Co. v. Monroe Binder Board Co., 232
N.Y. 503, 134 N.E. 547 (1921) ; IBM Corp. v. Barrett Div. of Allied Chemical & Dye Corp.,
16 A.D.2d 487, 229 N.Y.S.2d 547 (3d Dep't 1962); Rochester Happy House, Inc. v. Happy
House Shops, Inc., 14 AD.2d 491, 217 N.Y.S.2d 791 (4th Dep't 1961); Thames v. Lund,
34 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 263 App. Div. 1041, 34 N.Y.S.2d 416 (3d Dep't
1942); Schumann v. National Pressure Cooker Co., 256 App. Div. 1044, 10 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1st Dep't), reargument denied, 257 App. Div. 913, 12 N.Y.S.2d 772 (4th Dep't 1939)
(mem.).
37. 4 N.Y.2d 475, 151 N.E.2d 874, 176 N.Y.S.2d 318 (1958). For further cases dis-
cussing the test of "doing business" in the same business context see: MacInnes v. Fountaine-
bleau Hotel Corp., 257 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1958), wherein a Florida hotel corporation, all of
whose activities and attractions offered to guests were located in Miami Beach, was not
"doing business" in New York by reason of the fact that it maintained a small office in
New York City with three employees whose function it was to receive requests for reserva-
tions, which were forwarded to Florida for confirmation, and to answer inquiries and
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with facts similar to the instant decision, the fact that the New York office was
an independent travel agency was found crucial. Thus, that the peculiar facts
in each case are of great significance is apparent. Nevertheless, when such cases
as these are compared with cases arising under section 302, it is obvious that
the relationship to be proven is more restrictive in the 301 area than in the 302
area.38
In examining the facts of the instant case, the Court of Appeals held that
the defendant airline was "present" and "doing business" within the state, and
it was therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the courts. The relevant statutes
noted were section 224 of the General Corporations Law9 and CPLR section
301, through which the Court established the standing of plaintiff to bring the
suit, and the "basis" of the Court to determine the outcome of the suit,
respectively. Having affirmatively disposed of the issue of plaintiff's standing
to sue, the Court proceeded to the major question: ". . . whether within the
statute and cases defendant was 'doing business' in New York State, so as
to subject it to personal jurisdiction here."140 The Appellate Division answered
the question in the negative, holding the defendant's contacts too "incidental" 41
in nature to bring it under CPLR section 301, noting that the accident not
having arisen from the corporation's activities within the state precluded
jurisdiction under CPLR section 302 (a) (1),42 and moreover that "when viewed
distribute brochures; Weiderhorn v. The Sands, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1956);
Guile v. Sea Island Co., 66 N.Y.S.2d 467 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd, 272 App. Div. 881, 71
N.Y.S.2d 911, leave to appeal denied, 297 N.Y. 781, 77 N.E.2d 793 (1948); Schwartz v.
Breakers Hotel Corp., 13 Misc. 2d 508, 178 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
38. See, e.g., Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., Feathers v.
McLucas, Singer v. Walker, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965), wherein
solicitation, negotiation, and performance of services pursuant to a contract executed without
New York, was deemed sufficient to satisfy the "transacts any business" test of CPLR § 302,
in Longines-Wittnauer. Further, in Singer v. Walker, the court found that where the cor-
poration had shipped substantial quantities of its product into the state, directly resulting
from its solicitation within the state through representatives, advertisements and catalogues,
that it was "transacting business" sufficiently to become subject to jurisdiction. Also see
e.g., Steele v. DeLeeuw, 40 Misc. 2d 807, 244 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1963), wherein jurisdiction
was maintained on the basis of a simple contract signed within the state; Totero v. World
Telegram Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 594, 245 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Sup. Ct. 1963), wherein a defamation
action was upheld against a syndicated writer whose articles were distributed within the
state by the syndicate, arising out of a business transaction within the state.
39. [Now Bus. Corp. Law § 1314(1)] Providing in part: "an action against a foreign
corporation may be maintained by a resident of the state ...for any cause of action."
40. Bryant v. Finnish Natl Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 429, 208 N.E.2d 439, 440, 260
N.Y.S.2d 625, 626 (1965).
41. Bryant v. Finnish Natl Airline, 22 A.D.2d 16, 22, 253 N.Y.S.2d 215, 221 (1st
Dep't 1964).
42. "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary ... as to a
cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, in the same manner
as if he were a domiciliary of the state, if in person or through an agent he: transacts any
business within the state. . . ." (Emphasis added.) Under CPLR section 302(a) (1) the
test of "transacts any business" is to be distinguished from the test of "doing business"
under CPLR section 301, which is the more restrictive of the two. See 1 Weinstein, Korn,
Miller, New York Civil Practice, § 302.06 (1963). (See discussion in the text, pp. 432-34,
supra.) CPLR section 302(a) (1) is precluded from application in the instant case because
the "wrong must be connected with or flow from such business transacted in this state,"
and such is not the case here. Bryant v. Finnish Natl Airline, 22 A.D.2d 16, 22, 253 N.Y.S.2d
215, 221 (1st Dep't 1964). For further discussion see: 1 Weinstein, Korn, Miller, supra,
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in terms of . . . convenience, the equities did not favor plaintiff. .... .,43
The Court of Appeals disagreed. The applicable test of "doing business," as
set down in Simonson v. International Bank,44 declared the highest Court,
"should be a simple pragmatic one." 45 The fact that defendant operated no
aircraft within the United States was irrelevant under the case of Berner v.
United Airlines.4 The majority went on in its summation:
The New York office is one of many directly maintained by defendant
in various parts of the world, it has a lease on a New York office, it
employs several people and it has a bank account here, it does public
relations and publicity work for defendant here including maintaining
contacts with other airlines and travel agencies and, while it does
not make reservations or sell tickets, it transmits requests for space
to defendant in Europe and helps to generate business. These things
should be enough.47 (Emphasis added.)
Under the relevant tests, therefore, defendant airline was subject to the juris-
diction of the courts of the state.
Under the landmark decision of International Shoe the United States
Supreme Court ". . . defined the constitutional power of the states in asserting
jurisdiction over foreign corporations as being limited only by the notions of
fair play and substantial justice.149 Under McGee v. International Life In-
surance Co.,50 the Court noted that ". . . a trend is clearly discernible
toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions and other nonresidents." 51 The same notion has been expounded in cases
originating in New York state.5 2 What is presently apparent is that the Supreme
Court has opened a new area, in the realm of jurisdiction, into which the
states have the option to tread. They may expand their jurisdictional limits
by accepting the option, or they may remain within their present scope. New
York has chosen to expand the scope of its "doing business" conceptions with
§§ 301.14, .17, 302.06, .08. See also Homburger, The Reach of New York's Long-Arm:
Today and Tomorrow, 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 61 (1965); Casenote, 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 181(1965); Comment, Transacting Business as Jurisdictional Basis, A Survey of New York
Law, 14 Buffalo L. Rev. 525 (1965).
43. Bryant v. Finnish Natl Airline, 22 A.D.2d 16, 22, 253 N.Y.S.2d 215, 221-22 (1st
Dep't 1964).
44. Simonson v. International Bank, 16 A.D.2d 55, 225 N.Y.S.2d 392, aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d
281, 200 N.E.2d 427, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964).
45. Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 432, 208 N.E.2d 439, 441, 260
N.Y.S.2d 625, 629 (1965).
46. 3 N.Y.2d 1003, 147 N.E.2d 732, 170 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1957).
47. Bryant v. Finnish Natl Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 432, 208 N.E.2d 439, 441-42, 260
N.Y.S.2d 625, 629 (1965).
48. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
49. Amicus Curiae Brief on behalf of plaintiff, by a law firm specializing in aviation
negligence (hereafter Amicus Curiae), p. 6; Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426,
208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965).
50. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
51. Id. at 222.
52. E.g., Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443,
209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965); Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281,
200 N.E.2d 427, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964); Rondinelli v. Chicago, Rock Is. & Pac. R.R., 5
A.D.2d 842, 170 N.Y.S.2d 947 (2d Dep't 1958).
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its decision in Bryant v. Finnish National Airline. In an early lower court deci-
sion,55 it was declared that the state courts should follow the federal initiative,
although the Court of Appeals in its affirmance offered no opinion."4 "The
test . . . is and should be a simple pragmatic one,"55 declared the Court in
the instant case. Moreover, the equities were with the plaintiff in this situa-
tion. It was brought to the attention of the Court,56 that international airline
transportation had greatly increased and that many New York residents fly
abroad on foreign carriers, which solicit business here, as is the case with
Finnish National Airlines. The only effective and equitable means of redress
for New York residents is in the forums of the state, lest they be required to
return abroad to a foreign land to try their causes of action.57 This is consistent
with the "notions of fair play and substantial justice. '58
The decision in the instant case should be lauded as a progressive step in
the expansion of jurisdiction over non-resident corporations. Exactly how far
this decision takes the New York courts it is too early to determine. It would
seem apparent, however, that the instant case would overrule such a decision
as in Dineen v. United Airlines Transp. Corp.,5 9 thereby discarding the distinc-
tions formerly requisite under its companion case of Jensen v. United Airlines
Transp. Corp.60 Cases such as Miller v. Surf Properties, Inc.,61 and Great Lakes
Press Corp. v. Air Malta, Ltd.,62 are still distinguishable on their facts from the
instant case, in that the agency acting within the state was found independent.
Although no precise standard or line has been delineated,03 it would seem that
the instant decision incorporates to a greater extent the less restrictive rationale
of "transacts any business" utilized under CPLR section 302 (a) (1), rather
than the traditional "presence" test of Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co.04
under section 301; it may in fact even touch those outer limits of permissive-
ness set down in International Shoe. 5
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